Link Banana

Strange Maps highlights a study of the genetic commonality of Europeans. Finland’s a striking outlier. Other observations:

The extent of genetic variation is greater north to south than east to west. This may be a result of the way Europe was colonized by modern humans, i.e. from the south, in three successive waves of migration (45,000 years ago, where before there had only been Neanderthals; 17,000 years ago, after the last Ice Age; and 10,000 years ago, with the advent of farming techniques from the Middle East).

Yugoslav genetic variation is quite large (hence the big pink blob), and overlaps with the Greek, Romanian, Hungarian, Czech and even the Italian ones.

There is surprisingly little overlap between the northern and southern German populations, each of which has more in common with their other neighbours (Danish/Dutch/Swedish in the northern case, Austrian/Swiss/French in the other one).

The Swiss population is entirely subsumed by the French one, similarly, the Irish population almost doesn’t show any characteristics that would distinguish it from the British one.

This Green.view column raises some valuable points about Canada’s supposedly brutal seal hunts:

Still, groups such as the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) call it inhumane, and they have successfully lobbied politicians across Europe. In 2007, Belgium and the Netherlands banned trade in seal products. Other countries—perhaps even the whole European Union—may soon follow suit.

IFAW records hundreds of hours of video footage of the annual hunt, in which seals are killed either by shooting or with a hakapik, a heavy wooden club with a pick. Although IFAW feels the hunt is inhumane, a study published in the Canadian Veterinary Journal in 2002 concluded that most seals (about 98%) were killed in an acceptably humane manner.

Am I the only one who thinks it’s odd that that no gnomes live in France or Italy?

Though many angsty American teenagers probably think Europeans are “so much deeper” than American, this isn’t about that. This is about the fact that as a reformed geology nerd I feel obligated to take every possible opportunity to bring up the “Mohorovicic Discontintinuty.”

While the Earth’s global crust is an average of eight kilometers thick in the oceans and thirty-two kilometers thick under the continents, the new higher-res map shows a surprising amount of crust depth variation. The low-lands around the Netherlands sit on Pizza Hut flat rocks as thin (5-15 km) as some ocean crust while Finland’s got a 50+ kilometer thick lithosphere.

The scientists found that the so-called Mohorovicic Discontinuity, the boundary where the crust meets the mantle, lies at more variable depth than previously thought.

Some would say, and with good reason, that there’s no good reason to compare London and Paris. They’re different cities with different goals and different heritigates. Nonetheless, the comparison allows for a pretty interesting rundown of what problems and successes the two cities have had. For quick reference, the crux of the difference is roughly thus:

All the same, as Mr Sarkozy has lamented, Paris seems to lack London’s dynamism. Marc Levy, a French novelist who has chosen to make London his home, argues that the conservative attitude towards planning and architecture has a direct effect on creative life. “Paris doesn’t take risks, it lacks audacity,” he says. “How can you create a desire to innovate when the ambient culture is oriented towards preservation?”

The Economist’s Europe.view column takes a stance that sounds nearly pro-Serbian or pro-Russian on the issue of Kosovo’s independence. Regardless (or perhaps because) of that fact, it makes a number of worthy points.

What the EU will not say, but thinks privately, is this: We are supporting Kosovo’s independence because of the chance that it will become more like us, and hence a better neighbour. We oppose independence for Transdniestria et al because it would make them more like Russia, and therefore worse for Europe.

Perhaps it’s just me, but it seems like I’ve been hearing about this for so long that I was kind of shocked to read that it had actually happened.

This Europe.view column starts with an interesting premise:

IMAGINE Nazi rule in Germany surviving for decades, with Hitler undefeated in war and succeeded on his death in the early 1950s by a series of lacklustre party hacks who more or less disowned his “excesses”. Imagine then a “reform Nazi” (call him Michael Gorbach) coming to power in the 1980s and dismantling the National Socialist system, only to fall from power as the Third Reich collapsed in political and economic chaos.

Imagine a shrunken “German Federation” suffering ten years of upheaval, before an SS officer (call him Voldemar Puschnik) came to power, first as prime minister and then as president. Under eight years of rule by Herr Puschnik, Germany regains economic stability, largely thanks to a sky-high coal price.

It goes on to assert that current claims that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was legal and that the Katyn massacre was no perpetrated by the Russians are tantamount to Holocaust denial. Interesting stuff, whether or not you agree with it.

The Economist’s Charlemagne column has a fun way to judge Europe and understand it in contrast to the rest of the world. It’s an entertaining thought, even if sometimes feels like a stretch.

In the hunt for a distinctive European identity, consider toy brands, such as Denmark’s Lego or Germany’s Playmobil.

These firms may be dwarfed in America by titans like Mattel, but in Europe they are cultural giants, vying for top spots in markets such as France and Germany. In their designs, business models and philosophies, they offer a striking snapshot of European aspirations, anxieties and foibles. (Tellingly, toy bosses see Britain as a case apart, closer to the American market in taste, and showing what they call an “Anglo-Saxon” fondness for heavily marketed novelties tied to films or television.)

Parag Khanna has an interesting piece in the forthcoming New York Times Magazine about America’s declining influence in the world. Though I think he does overreach — seeming to favor unrealistic certainty (which sometimes becomes outright alarmism) over necessary nuance — his broad narrative rings true.

At best, America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world.

If you lack the patience to read the whole thing, I’d recommend his policy priorities as the most interesting bit.

The Economist’s Charlemagne (Europe) column provides an interesting and useful summary of how the America’s election madness is seen on the continent.

VOTERS of America, well done: you are less racist (or sexist) than Europeans had feared. Remember, though, that you are rather naive: please try to pick a competent president this time. This dismissive summary, combining condescension with distrust, captures all too many European reactions to the duel between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton for the Democratic nomination in this year’s presidential election (and, given the gulf between most Europeans and the Republicans, this is the contest to be Europe’s preferred candidate as well—although a few Europeans retain a soft spot for John McCain).

The Economist has an interesting story about the new dynamics within Germany’s rapidly-growing Jewish community.

By the time the Berlin Wall fell, Germany’s Jewish community had only 30,000 ageing members and was dwindling rapidly. Today it is the third-largest, and the fastest-growing, Jewish population in western Europe, after France and Britain. Between 1991, when the country was unified and immigration rules relaxed, and 2005, more than 200,000 Jews from the former Soviet Union emigrated to Germany. (At the same time, more than a million emigrated from the former Soviet Union to Israel and about 350,000 to America, leaving only about 800,000 behind.) In some parts of Germany, immigrants—usually referred to as “the Russians”—make up 90% of the local Jewish population.