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Foreign Policy’s Passport examines the recent violence in Chechnya.

Russia has maintained order in Chechnya largely by arming [Chechnyan President Ramzan] Kadyrov and his fellow ex-rebels, an approach not unlike the U.S.’s “Anbar awakening” strategy in Iraq. According to Reuters, Russian military analysts now worry that they may have created a force they can’t control if Kadyrov’s loyalties shift. Kadyrov is a staunch Putinist (he even delivered a dubious 99.5 percent voter turnout for the ruling party in parliamentary elections), but could he turn against his bosses in Moscow with Medvedev in power? Bernstein doesn’t see this as likely. In fact, Kadyrov is probably quite satisfied with Putin’s choic.

The Economist, like most Western observers, has some strong words about the election of Dmitry Medvedev earlier today.

The polling station, and the country, have been hijacked by security men who do not even pretend to follow the law. The location of this incident, a busy shopping area, was also symbolic. Overwhelmed by the cornucopia of foreign goods, Russian consumers have so far been distracted from the Kremlin’s shenanigans.

The Christian Science Monitor sees some interesting demographics within Russia — and goes some small way toward explaining Putin’s popularity:

They are the Putin generation: young, often worldly, optimistic about their country’s future, and enthusiastic about a democracy they see as having more to do with higher living standards than checks and balances or freedom of speech. Acquainted only through history with the Soviet Union’s oppressive grip, but distinctly aware of their parents’ challenges during the tumultuous 1990s, they live in a Russia of unprecedented opportunities – ones shaped profoundly by Putin’s strong hand over the past eight years.

The American make a pretty interesting comparison between the price of oil and Vladimir Putin’s aggression abroad.

We found that as the price of oil rose, the aggressiveness index increased: that is, the more valuable oil became, the more hostile Russian foreign policy became. The reverse was also true: when oil prices dropped in 2001 and 2002, so did Russia’s aggression. The relationship proved strongest at the annual level: a $1.48 increase in oil prices yearly correlated with an additional “point” increase in Russian aggression.

The Economist has an odd story about a conspicuously popular television documentary in Russia.

The film’s usage of modern words and imagery is so conspicuous that the moral cannot escape a Russian viewer. Instead of sticking to its traditions, Byzantium tried to reform and modernise, as the West demanded, and it paid the price. Worst of all, the West infiltrated Byzantium with harmful, individualistic ideas, which destroyed the core values of the empire—so the people lost faith in their rulers.

This Europe.view column starts with an interesting premise:

IMAGINE Nazi rule in Germany surviving for decades, with Hitler undefeated in war and succeeded on his death in the early 1950s by a series of lacklustre party hacks who more or less disowned his “excesses”. Imagine then a “reform Nazi” (call him Michael Gorbach) coming to power in the 1980s and dismantling the National Socialist system, only to fall from power as the Third Reich collapsed in political and economic chaos.

Imagine a shrunken “German Federation” suffering ten years of upheaval, before an SS officer (call him Voldemar Puschnik) came to power, first as prime minister and then as president. Under eight years of rule by Herr Puschnik, Germany regains economic stability, largely thanks to a sky-high coal price.

It goes on to assert that current claims that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was legal and that the Katyn massacre was no perpetrated by the Russians are tantamount to Holocaust denial. Interesting stuff, whether or not you agree with it.